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I Comments

"Tain't What You Do":* Effect of China's
Proposed Anti-Monopoly Law on State

Owned Enterprises
Joel R. Samuels**
I.

Introduction

As the globalization phenomenon continues to intertwine nations,
economic activities of one country affect others in turn. No longer are
markets separate, independent actors cloistered from global effects, but
rather one, unified marketplace is emerging. As a part of this transition,
countries that had little global economic impact are starting to develop
international trade. One region of the world that has partaken in this
movement consists of the countries on the Pacific Rim.
China, one of the world's most populated countries, is a growing
Jimmy Lunceford, 'Tain 't What You Do (It's The Way That Cha Do It), (Classics
Records 1939).
** J.D. Candidate 2008, The Pennsylvania State University, the Dickinson School
of Law; B.A. Political Science; B.A. Economics, Saint Louis University, 2005. I wish to
thank Professors of Law, Susan Beth Farmer, John E. Lopatka, and Larry Cata Backer as
well as Dr. Patric J. Welch, Professor of Economics at Saint Louis University for their
invaluable assistance. I am also grateful to the members of Samuels family who instilled
the value of academic knowledge. Finally, I thank Ms. Sarah Young for her advice and
steadfast encouragement especially during the writing process.
*
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international economic force. Long viewed as a treasure trove of
underutilized economic potential, China appropriately acquired the
nickname "sleeping giant." In recent history, China has awakened and is
realizing its economic potential.' Ingrained in this transition are changes
in the government's role in the economy, including regulation of one of
China's economic pillars, the state owned enterprise.
In most cases, government market regulation occurs through
Antitrust enforcement. Antitrust laws regulate the amalgamation of
capital in a single entity. These laws originated in the United States at
the turn of the 2 0 t h Century when companies in industries such as oil,
beef, railroads, sugar, and whisky merged to form large corporations, or
"trusts." 2

Concerned about the potential for anticompetitive abuses,

many states passed antitrust laws. 3 Following their lead, Congress
enacted the Sherman Act in 1890,4 which was shortly followed by other
Acts such as the Clayton Act,5 the Federal Trade Commission Act 6 and
the Robinson-Patman Act. 7 Taken together these Acts limit abuses by
business entities that "unreasonably restrain trade," 8 conspire with one
another, 9 "attempt to monopolize,"' 1 fix prices,1" or pursue other
anticompetitive behavior. 12 Following the lead of13the United States,
other countries have enacted their own antitrust laws.
Recognizing the importance of market regulation, both the World
Trade Organization (WTO) and the European Union (EU) have made the
existence of antitrust laws 14 a requirement for entry. 15 In order to join
1. China is currently the fourth largest economy based on GDP. Ben Bemanke,
Chairman, Fed. Res., Remarks at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences: The Chinese
15,
2006),
available at
Progress
and
Challenges
(Dec.
Economy:
http://www.federalreserve.gov./BoardDocs/Speeches/2006/20061215/default.htm.
2. A.D. NEALE & D.G. GOYDER, THE ANTITRUST LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 15-20 (3d ed. 1980).
3. Interview with John Lopatka, Professor of Law, The Dickinson School of Law of
the Pennsylvania State University, in University Park, Pa. (Jan. 23, 2007).

4. See 15 U.S.C. § 1(1890).
5. See 15 U.S.C. § 12 et seq. (1914).
6. See 15 U.S.C. § 41 (1914).

7. See 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1936).
8. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1890).
9. See id.
10. Id.
11. See 15 U.S.C. § 12 et seq. (1914).
12. See 15 U.S.C. § 41 (1914).
13. In recent years, newly industrialized countries, such as Taiwan, India, Korea and
the Philippines have enacted antitrust laws. E.g., The Competition Act, 2002, No. 12,
Acts of Parliament, 2003 (India).
14. Antitrust statutes are also referred to as competition laws. See, e.g., European
Commission,

Directorate General for

Competition, http://ec.europa.eu/comm/

competition/indexen.html (last visited July 18, 2007).
15. WTO values free competition.
See The World Trade Organization,
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these organizations and receive trade benefits, 6 a country must have
The European
"existence of a functioning market economy."' 7
Economic Community issued regulations in 1957 pursuant to Article 81
of the Treaty of Rome,18 restricting abuse of a dominant position, price
fixing, and other anticompetitive actions similar to those addressed by
the U.S. Sherman Act.19
As a part of its transition from a Marxist society and with the goal
of fostering economic development and competition,20 China has started
the process of moving to a market economy. 2 A challenge to this
change is the presence of large, inefficient, and anticompetitive state
owned enterprises (SOEs).22 A ten year process 23 culminated in the
drafting of an Anti-Monopoly Law (AML) in 2004.24 This law has gone
through many revisions resulting in a draft recently passed by the
Cabinet in June of 2006 (Current Draft).25 If fruitful, the AML will
further integrate China into greater acceptance in the global marketplace
Understanding the WTO: Basics, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/whatise/
tif_e/fact l_e.htm (last visited July 18, 2007).
16. The criteria promulgated at the 1993 Copenhagen European Council states, in
order to accede to the EU, a country must have the "existence of a functioning market
economy and the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces." That
implies that a country has antitrust and other competition laws in place. See European
http://europa.eulscadplus/glossary/
Criteria,
Commission,
Copenhagen
accessioncriteriascopenhagueen.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2007).
17. Id.
18. The Treaty of Rome established the European Economic Community and was
ratified in 1957. See European Commission, Treaties and Laws, http://europa.eu/abc/
treaties/index..en.htm. (last visited Jan. 20, 2007).
19. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community arts. 81, 82, Mar. 25,
1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 4 [hereinafter Treaty of Rome].
20. See Draft Anti-Monopoly Law, art. 1 (June 22, 2006) (PRC).
21. China started enacting market regulation legislation including anti-monopoly
legislation in 1995. Throughout this process, China has solicited advice from the
international antitrust enforcement community. See Selene Ko, Chinese Anti-Monopoly
Law: An Introductionto Chinese Legislation, 3 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REv. 267-68
(2004). Several drafts of the Anti-Monopoly law have been circulated such as the 2002,
2004, 2005 and 2006 drafts which have received feedback from international antitrust
enforcers. See H. Stephen Harris, The Making of an Antitrust Law: The Pending AntiMonopoly Law of the People'sRepublic of China, 7 CHI. J. INT'L L. 169, 172-83 (2006).

22. See David Blumenthal, "Reform" or "Opening"? Reform of China's State
Owned Enterprises and WTO Accession-The Dilemma of Applying GATT to
Marketizing Economies, 16 UCLA PAC. BASIN. L.J. 198, 201-03 (1998).
23. China started drafting the AML in 1994. See Hu Yuanyuan, China Okays Draft
Anti-Monopoly

Law,

CHINA

DAILY,

June

8,

2006,

available

at

http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2006-06/08/content_611238.htm.
24. Id. The current draft, dated June 22, 2006 is entitled Anti-Monopoly Law of the
People's Republic of China. Draft Anti-Monopoly Law (P.R.C.) June 22, 2006 (China)
[hereinafter 2006 Draft AML], availableat http://www.buyusa.gov/asianow/270.pdf (last
visited Jan. 29, 2007).
25. The draft law requires approval from the State Council and the National People's
Congress in order to take effect. See Hu Yuanyuan, supra note 23.
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and further cement relations between the Asian nation and its fellow
WTO members.26 The AML's success is dependent in part upon China
enforcing its provisions against state run interests. 27 Adequately enforced
regulations curbing SOEs' involvement will create a market conducive to
foreign investment.28
This Comment focuses on the AML's importance and how it may
significantly impact state-owned enterprises. Part I provides economic
background. Part II describes the current Chinese marketplace and the
importance of SOEs. Part III provides a brief overview of China's
policies for market regulation. Part IV explains the proposed AML and
its effect on SOEs. Part V discusses whether China's enforcement of the
AML will sufficiently comport with the Western world's expectations,
particularly those of the United States. This analysis will be conducted
in a game theoretical forum.
II.

Economic Principles 29-"Take

a piece of the pie." 30

Judge Richard Posner notes that economics is an integral part of
antitrust and market regulation analysis.3' While there are economic
applications in various areas of the law, this Comment focuses on
economic analysis of marketplace interactions and governmental
regulation. To provide a basis for analysis and understand China's new
law, an understanding of key economic terms is helpful.
A.

Governmental Role in the Economy
In a capitalist market, economic actors

interact with little

26. Joining the WTO will allow China to receive preferential trade relations with
member countries, provide an international trade dispute resolution remedies, and allows
the formation and regulation of international trade agreements. See The World Trade
Organization, Understanding the WTO: Basics Principles of the Trading System,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/whatis-e/tif e/fact2_e.htm (last visited Jan. 21,
2007). Market regulation and transparency is crucial to accessing WTO relations and
benefits. Id.
27. China's State Owned Enterprises account for seventeen to fifty percent of GDP.
George Wehrfritz et al., The New State Capitalists: Governments Are Getting Back into
the Business of Business, NEWSWEEK INT'L, May 1, 2006, at 3. The AML aims to
provide a competitive business environment to which government operated SOEs provide
an obstacle. Id.
28. See The World Trade Organization, Understandingthe WTO: Basics Principles
of the Trading System; The Case for Open Trade, http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/
whatis e/tif e/fact3_e.htm (last visited Jan. 21, 2007).
29. These definitions reflect an American view and are not meant to be definitive.
Where possible, different views are indicated.
30. DAVE FRISHBERG, Walkin' on Wallstreet, on RETROMANIA: AT THE JAZz BAKERY
(Arbors Records 2006).
31. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF Law 23 (6th ed. 2003).
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government intervention.32 Under Adam Smith's laissez-faire doctrine,33
government interference is only justified to set up the rules of the
economic game and to intervene in situations of market failure.34 In
accordance with these principles, antitrust laws seek to preserve
competition between economic actors and prevent market distortions.35
The United States is a global leader in antitrust enforcement.36
Even though competition control measures were present at common law,
the Sherman Act of 1890 was the first federal statute that made
anticompetitive behavior a felony.37 The Sherman Act expressly
38
prohibits unilateral monopolization and multilateral restraints of trade.
The EU followed suit in the 1950s with Article 81 of the Treaty of
Rome. 39 As the Pacific Rim countries 40 industrialize, they are enacting
32. Capitalism refers to the economic principles that marketplace decisions (what to
produce, how much to produce and at what price) are decided by private (nongovernmental) actors.

See

DAVID O'CONNOR,

BASIC ECONOMICS

47-48 (2004).

Capitalism embodies the ideals of the laissez-faire doctrine promulgated by Adam Smith.
This doctrine promotes a "hands off' view of governmental involvement in economic
functions. Id. According to the doctrine, government involvement is limited to
establishing boundaries for market interaction, providing a stable and peaceful
environment for market interactions, and should only intervene in situations of market
failure such as monopolies, asymmetric information, public goods, and to control certain
externality effects. See id. at 52; see also ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE
AND CAUSES OF WEALTH OF NATIONS (1776).

33.

See SMITH, supranote 32.

34. Id.
35. Antitrust laws seek to prevent monopolization effects such as shortages caused
by extreme reductions in output coupled with high demand for the product, price
disequilibrium as a result of price fixing, and distributional inequities such as geographic

market divisions.

See

generally WILLIAM LETWIN, LAW AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN

AMERICA: THE EVOLUTION OF THE SHERMAN ACT (1965).
36. The United States was one of the first countries to enact competition laws and
continues to have large enforcement agencies such as the Department of Justice, the
Federal Trade Commission and State Attorneys General. U.S. enforcement officials are
sought for advice by other countries as they develop their own antitrust laws. Interview
with Susan Beth Farmer, Professor of Law, The Dickinson School of Law of the
Pennsylvania State University, in University Park, Pa. (Jan. 23, 2007). For example,
China solicited advice from U.S. officials in the drafting of the AML. Id.
37. Prior to the passing of the Sherman Act, the United States lacked a federal law
providing criminal punishment such as fines and imprisonment. See NEALE & GOYDER,
supra note 2, at 18.
38. 15 U.S.C. 2 ("Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or
combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize.., shall be deemed
guilty of a felony.").
39. The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market:
all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings
and concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States and
which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of
competition within the common market.
Treaty of Rome, supranote 19, art. 81.
40. Pacific Rim countries include Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and

China. See generally RAVI ARVIND

PALAT, CAPITALIST RESTRUCTURING AND THE PACIFIC
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competition laws to fully interact with the global market.
B.

Market Interactions Under Perfect Competition

The purpose of marketplace interactions is the accumulation of
capital through trade of goods and services. 4' In a perfectly competitive
environment,42 market supply and demand control the price and quantity
of goods bought and sold.43 A seller does not have the power to
unilaterally set market price and sells the quantity that will maximize its
profit given the conditions set by the market." Charging prices lower
than the equilibrium price set in the market results in shortages and
forbearance of profits that could be realized by selling additional units.45
Charging a price above the equilibrium
price will also result in
46
sales.
decreased
to
due
profits
diminished
One of the core principles of a free market economy is that no firm
has market power.4 7 Market power is derived from the firm's percentage
share of the relevant market and is defined as the ability of a firm to set
prices above marginal cost. 48 A firm that has a large enough market
share to unilaterally affect market conditions, including the ability to
maintain a higher setting price by reducing output, has market power.49
C. Monopoly Behavior"
The U.S. Supreme Court held that a firm restrains competition, and
RIM (2004).

41.

See

E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, POLICY

AND PROCEDURE: CASES, MATERIALS, PROBLEMS 41 (5th ed. 2004).
42. Perfect Competition assumes free entry and exit from the market, free exchange
of information, and no market power or multiple firms. See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS
ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 37 (4th ed. 2004).
43. Firms take price as a given and set output based on marginal cost. See William
M. Landes & Richard A. Poser, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 HARV. L. REV. 937,
938-55 (1981). Therefore, a firm produces where price and marginal cost intersect. Id.
44. See O'CONNOR, supra note 32, at 117-18.
45. Id. at 137-41.
46. Id.
47. Id. at H17-18.
48. SULLIVAN & HOVENKAMP, supra note 41, at 51-52.
49. The European Commission has determined that abuse of a dominant position
occurs at fifty percent or when a firm has twice the market share of the next largest firm.
See D.M. RAYBOULD & ALISON FIRTH, LAW OF MONOPOLIES; COMPETITION LAW AND

PRACTICE IN THE USA, EEC, GERMANY AND THE UK 323-34 (1991). The U.S. courts
have indicated that a market share of seventy percent or more is sufficient to support a
section 2 claim. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SECTION OF ANTITRUST, ANTITRUST
LAW DEVELOPMENTS
243-45 (4th ed. 1997) [hereinafter ANTITRUST LAW
DEVELOPMENTS].

50. For an in-depth economic analysis of monopolies see POSNER, supra note 31, at
273-86.
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thereby violates Section 2 of the Sherman Act,5 ' if it artificially creates
and maintains monopoly power.5 2 The Court defined monopoly power
as the "power to control prices or exclude competition., 53 Natural
55
monopolies 54 have not been subject to rigid antitrust enforcement.
Economically, a monopolist can have a negative impact on the
market. 6 Whereas a competitive firm will charge a price equal to its
marginal cost, a monopolist prices above its marginal cost, which often
results in a price higher than the competitive price.5 7 Monopolies are
often further criticized as being inefficient and lacking innovation.58
Economists claim the total marketplace is injured through dead weight
loss, 59 waste, 60 higher prices, and lower output.6 1 Moreover, monopolists
62
have an incentive to create barriers to entry into that market.
Ultimately, monopolists prevent free competition and perpetuate
inefficiencies that harm consumers by preventing optimal consumption
and charging a price higher than the purely competitive price.63
51. 15. U.S.C. § 2 ("Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize,
or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the
trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed
guilty of a felony."). See fn 39.
52. United States v. Grinell, 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966) ("[S]ection 2 of the
Sherman Act has two elements(l) the possession of monopoly powering the relevant
market and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power."). The second
element includes anticompetitive effects such as exclusive dealings, price fixing, price
discrimination, raising rivals costs, and refusals to deal.
See Antitrust Law
Developments, supra note 49, at 244-45.
53. Grinell, 384 U.S. at 571 (citing United States v. E.I. du Pont Nemours & Co.,
351 U.S. 377, 391 (1955)).
54. Natural monopolies occur as a result of "a superior product, business acumen, or
historical accident." Id. at 571.
55. See ERNEST GELLHORN ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS 142-43 (2004).
56. See generallyPOSNER, supranote 31, at 278-84.
57. The seller will sell a quantity where marginal revenue of selling an additional
unit will be outweighed by the marginal cost of production of the unit. Id. at 57.
58. Instead of developing a better product and lower cost, a monopolist may spend
resources on maintaining its monopoly on the existing product. Id. at 56-58.
59. Dead weight loss is the value of goods that would be produced in a purely
competitive society, but are not produced by monopolist. POSNER, supra note 31, at 27880.
60. Waste refers to inefficient use of resources, such as creating and maintaining a
monopoly, rather than improving the product. See SULLIVAN & HOVENKAMP, supra note
41, at 56-57.
61. Thus, consumers who would purchase X quantity of goods at Y price are forced
to pay higher prices (assuming relatively inelastic demand) or are shut out of the market
(in the case of elastic demand). See POSNER, supra note 31, at 273-76.
62. See SULLIVAN & HOVENKAMP, supra note 41, at 57. Assuming the monopolist is
able to prevent entry, entry barriers are a form of waste, as resources that would normally
go into production are spent maintaining the monopoly through restricting entry. Id.
Theoretically, existence of a monopoly invites entry efforts as potential entrants realize
profit by increasing output at a lower price. Id.
63. See POSNER, supra note 31, at 276-78.
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State-OwnedEnterprises

State-owned enterprises (SOEs) operate differently than public
companies. 64 Ownership is one such aspect; publicly held companies are
owned by private investors and controlled by a Board of Directors,65
comparatively, government agencies manage and control SOEs.66
Publicly held corporations are subject to government regulation 67 but are
not controlled by the government. Another difference is that SOEs act
anti-competitively especially when given favorable treatment to the
detriment of other firms in the marketplace. 68 This may result in SOEs
serving as a barrier to entry into the market.69
In regards to profitability, while private companies are profit
seekers,7 ° SOEs have different goals. SOEs objectives include providing
employment, expansion, or increased revenue, typically without cost
concerns.7 1 These behaviors can lead to market inefficiencies.72 Public
companies that act without regard to profit can sustain loses, ultimately
73
forcing a company to file either Chapter 7 or Chapter 11 bankruptcy.
China has used SOEs to provide increased supply and employment
to specific industries without profit motivation.74 Due to the lack of
profit driven incentives, Chinese SOEs became inefficient and often
faced budgetary shortfalls.75 Instead of exiting the market as one would
64. See Deborah Kay Johns, Reforming the State-Enterprise Property Relationship
in the People's Republic of China: The Corporatizationof State-Owned Enterprises, 16
MICH. J. INT'L L. 911,923-27 (1995).
65. JEFFREY BAUMAN ET AL., CORPORATIONS LAW AND POLICY 33 (5th ed. 2003).
66. Id.
67. See, e.g., Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 41-51 (1914), Delaware
Corporation Act, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 101.
68. SOEs typically receive favorable treatment from politicians including financial
bail-out arrangements for poorly performing SOEs. See generally Yiping Huang &
Ligang Song, State Owned Enterprise and Bank Reform in China: Conditions for
Liberalization of the Capital Account, in REFORM AND RECOVERY IN EAST ASIA: THE
ROLE OF THE STATE AND ECONOMIC ENTERPRISE 214, 214-16 (Peter Drysdale ed. 2000).

69. As a result of state objectives for SOEs, normal economic activity is injured as
other firms may face substantial entry costs including lengthy and expensive bureaucratic
approval processes. Further, in many countries SOEs are not allowed to exit the market,
even when running substantial deficits.

See ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC Co-

OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, PRIVATISING STATE OWNED ENTERPRISES; AN OVERVIEW

OF POLICIES AND PRACTICES IN OECD COUNTRIES 20 (2003) [hereinafter OECD].

70. David E.M. Sappington & J. Gregory Sidak, Competition Law for State-Owned
Enterprises,71 ANTITRUST L.J. 479, 499-500 (2003).
71. See OECD, supra note 69.
72. See id.
73. See Sec. & Exch. Comm., Corporate Bankruptcy, http://www.sec.gov/investor/
pubs/bankrupt.htm (last visited Nov. 8, 2006).
74. See DONALD HAY, DEREK MORRIS, GuY LIU & SHUJIE YAO, ECONOMIC REFORM
AND STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES INCHINA 1979-1987, at 5 (1994).

75.

Id.
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expect in perfect competition, these budgetary shortcomings were offset
by government allocations, which allowed the business to survive.76 The
allocations created market distortions and slowed economic growth.
In effect, SOEs can act as monopolies.77 Monopolistic abuses by
SOEs can manifest in several ways. SOEs operate like monopolies
because they set price and output without regard to market forces. 78 This
can result in anti-competitive prices and inefficiencies.79 An SOE may
80
act anti-competitively by forcing its competitors to raise costs.
Expansion and revenue dominate profit interests and allow the SOE to
accept a price lower than the competitive price. 8' This can result in
market distortions that further injure consumers. 82 Ultimately, welfare is
harmed by the presence of an inefficient firm through waste and the
higher prices it can charge after driving rivals from the market.83
'
III. Market Interactions in China-"China, on the sea shore

A.

84

Economic Impact Of State Owned Enterprises

In order to conduct a fair analysis of the draft Anti-Monopoly Law
(AML), an overview of the composition of China's market is warranted.
Prior to 1978, China was a command economy 85 controlled by leaders
who stymied reforms, such as privatization of SOEs. 86 With the election
of President Deng Xiaoping, China instituted reforms and started to
move toward a competitive economy.87 Most notably, Deng encouraged
markets to operate with little support or control from the State.88
The Deng initiatives had little success in the 1980s. 89 However,

76. See Blumenthal, supra note 22, at 213-15.
77. SOEs pose economic harms similar to those caused by monopolies such as
inefficiencies, output restrictions, and financial waste. See Johns, supra note 64, at 91516.
78. See POSNER, supra note 31, at 276-78.
79. See Sappington & Sidak, supra note 70, at 504-07.
80. See id. at 508-12.
81. Id.at 509.
82. Id. at 509-11.
83. See SULLIVAN & HOVENKAMP, supra note 41, at 57-58, 187.
84. WANG CHUNG, China, on HUANG CHUNG (One Way Records 1995) (1982).
85. A command economy is one in which the allocation of resources, product type
and quantity produced, and other economic decisions are made by the government. See
O'CONNOR, supra note 32, at 7-8.
86. See ANDREW WEDEMAN, FROM MAO TO MARKET:
PROTECTIONISM, AND MARKETIZATION IN CHINA 4 (2003).

RENT SEEKING, LOCAL

87. Jared A. Berry, Anti-Monopoly Law in China: A Socialist Market Economy
Wrestles with Its Antitrust Regime, 2 INT'L L. & MGMT. REV. 129, 134-35 (2005).
88. Id. at 134.
89. See Harris, supra note 21, at 173.
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gradual change toward a competitive economy occurred in the 1990s, as
China passed legislation creating free market incentives in preparation
for accession into the World Trade Organization.9" China acceded to the
WTO in 200291 and continues to address the conditions of accession.
Even with a push for reform and transition to a free market economy,
progress has been slowed by SOEs.
State owned enterprises are an invention of the Chinese Communist
Party (CCP). 92 After coming to power, the CCP sought to solidify its
control and prevent the Kuomintang from returning to power. 93 As a part
of this strategy, the CCP acquisitioned ownership in private companies
and replaced most managerial positions with loyal party members.94 By
1955, the majority of private companies were operated by state managers
and were transformed into SOEs.95
SOEs account for a large percentage of Chinese economic growth.
There are approximately 380,000 SOEs 9 6 with over 78 million
employees 97 and SOEs have a significant impact on gross domestic
product (GDP).98 In 1978, SOE economic activity accounted for eighty
percent of GDP. 99 As a result of recent privatization of SOEs, 100 current
indices assess SOE contribution to GDP between seventeen to fifty
percent.10 1 Considerable efforts have been made in most market sectors
to privatize SOEs. 10 2 In other sectors, China is increasing state control in

90. In order to accede to the WTO, China agreed to publish laws and regulations
relating to trade, place restrictions on price controls, and enact legislation permitting
market forces to determine price and allocation of resources. See World Trade
Organization,Protocol on the Accession of the People's Republic of China to the World
Trade Organization, WT/L/432 (Nov. 10, 2001), available at http://www.mac.doc.gov/
ChinaiProtocolandDecision.pdf.
91. Press Release, World Trade Organization, WTO Ministerial Conference
Approves China's Accession (Nov. 11, 2001), available at http://www.wto.org/
English/news.e/ presO I Ie/pr252_.e.htm.
92. JUNE TEUFEL DREYER, CHINA'S POLITICAL SYSTEM, MODERNIZATION AND
TRADITION 145 (5th ed. 2006).
93. Id. at 145-46.
94. Id.
95. The CCP purchased shares or outright replaced management of private
enterprises and transformed them into SOEs. See MARK BORTHWICK, PACIFIC CENTURY:
THE EMERGENCE OF MODERN PACIFIC ASIA 404 (1992).

96. Xinqiang Sun, Reform of China's State-Owned Enterprises: A Legal
Perspective, 31 ST. MARY'S L.J. 19, 21 (1999).
97. See ERIC THuN, CHANGING LANES IN CHINA: FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT,
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS AND AUTO SECTOR DEVELOPMENT 49 (2006).
98. Gross Domestic Product measures the total value of goods and services produced
by a country in one year. O'CONNOR, supra note 32, at 224.
99. Wehrfritz, supra note 27.
100.

See WEDEMAN, supra note 86.

101.
102.

Wehrfritz, supra note 27.
See WEDEMAN, supra note 86, at 4-12.
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furtherance of socialist values.' 0 3 For example, in the interest of
promoting safe work environments, China plans to increase state control
in the mining industry from seventy percent to seventy-eight percent by
2010.104

SOEs are not characteristic of an open market and can exercise
anticompetitive behavior resulting in adverse economic effects. In some
regard, China's SOEs make the market stagnant. SOEs have been highly
inefficient, often incurring large budge shortfalls due to non-economic
goals.10 5 China's major banks compounded the issue by extending loans
to SOEs that have not been repaid. 0 6 In 2002, SOEs accounted for 48.2
percent of all non-performing debt within China. 0 7 Non-performing
loans lead to insolvency in the financial markets,108 effectively drain the
money supply, and lead to stagnation. 0 9 Effective regulation of SOEs is
needed to curtail further economic stagnation and fully transition to an
open market economy.
B.

China's Regulation of Markets
1.

Administrative Agencies

A number of Ministries oversee economic activity in China.11 0 In
regard to comprehensive regulation, the State Administration for
Industry and Commerce (SAIC) and Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM)
are charged with creating and setting economic policy on a national
scale. 1
SAIC oversees private and public competition,' 12 creates
103.
104.

See Wehrfritz, supra note 27.
Id.

105.

See Sappington & Sidak, supra note 70.

106.

See Blumenthal, supra note 22.
Geng Xiao, Nonperforming Debts in Chinese
Enterprises: Patterns, Causes, and Implications for Banking Reform, (April 12-13, 2004)
(unpublished panel paper on file with the Ctr for Strategic and Intl Stud. and Mass. Inst.
of Tech).
108. See Blumenthal, supra note 22, at 213-15.
109. Id.
110. Economic activity is regulated by various government departments such as the
Ministry of Commerce, the State Administration for Industry and Commerce, the
National Development and Reform Commission and the State Administration on Foreign
e.g.,
CHINA
MINISTRY
OF
COMMERCE,
Mission,
Exchange.
See,
http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/mission.shtml (last visited July 18, 2007); State Admin. For
Ind. & Commerce, Mission, http://gsyj.saic.gov.cn/wcm/WCMData/pub/saic/english/
About%20Us/t20060225_14598.htm (last visited July 18, 2007) (PRC).
Mission, http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/
111. See Ministry of Commerce,
mission.shtml (last visited July 18, 2007); see also, China Internet Infor. Ctr, The
Organizational Structure of the State Council, http://www.china.org.cn/english/
kuaixun/64784.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2006).
112. See State Admin. for Ind. & Commerce, Mission, http://gsyj.saic.gov.cn/wcm/

107.
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regulations,' 13 drafts laws to be considered by the National People's
Congress and enforces competition policy. 114 In early 2006, SAIC
passed laws regulating joint 8 ventures,' 15 advertisements,' 1 6 consumer
rights," 7 and product quality."
MOFCOM's purview is similar to that of SAIC, with an additional
concentration on foreign investments." 9 While SAIC focuses on
individual actors, MOFCOM regulation centers on domestic and foreign
2'
trade. 120 MOFCOM addresses issues such as customs procedures,'
22 and anti-dumping regulations.123
regulations on imports and exports,
2.

Legislation

China enacted laws governing different elements of competition. In
1992, SAIC promulgated "Certain Regulations on Prohibiting AntiThese
Competitive Practices of Public Enterprises Decree." 24
by
public
enterprises
(including
SOEs)
regulations protect against abuses
from artificially interfering with supply and demand. 125 The People's
Congress 26 passed the Anti-Unfair Competition Law of 1993,127 with the
intention of creating an open market economy, free of corrupt practices,
WCMData/pub/saic/english/About%20Us/t20060225_14598.htm (last visited July 18,
2007) (PRC).
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. See State Admin. for Ind. & Commerce, Laws and Regulations,
http://gsyj.saic.gov.cn/wcm/WCMData/pub/saic/english/Laws%/20and%/20Regulations/
default.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2006) (P.R.C.).
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Ministry of Commerce, Mission, http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/mission.shtml
(last visited July 18, 2007) (PRC).
120. Id.
121. See Ministry of Commerce, Policy, http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/static/column/
policyrelease/domesticpolicy.html/1 (last visited Oct. 10, 2006)(PRC).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Certain Regulations on Prohibiting Anti-Competitive Practices of Public
Enterprises Decree No. 20 (promulgated by the State Admin. for Ind. & Commerce
effective Dec. 12, 1992).
125. Id. at art. IV.
126. The National People's Congress (NPC) is China's highest administrative,
legislative and enforcement body. Members are elected representatives based on
provincial designations. See Nat'l People's Cong. of China, OrganizationInformation:
National Peoples Congress, http://www.npc.gov.cn/zgrdw/english/organization/congress/
congressLink.jsp. (last visited Jan. 12, 2006). The NPC functions in a similar fashion as
the United States Congress. See id.
127. Law for Countering Unfair Competition Promulgated by Order No. 19 of the
State Administration of Industry and Commerce on December 24,1993 (P.R.C.),
availableat http://www.apeccp.org.tw/doc/China/Decision/cndec04.html.
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fraud, and price controls. 28 The Anti-Unfair Competition Law also
129
contains supervisory measures and sanctions for violating its mandate.
In 1997, the State Development and Reform Commission 130 promulgated
to curtail
the "Provisional Rules for Monopoly Pricing"'13' that seeks
32
power.1
market
of
abuse
prevent
and
prices
high
artificially
In 1998, SAIC promulgated "Interim Provisions on Prohibiting BidRigging" to prevent and regulate fraud in bidding processes.' 3 3 In 2003,
after China's accession into the WTO, the SAIC was concerned that
foreign investors would have too much control in the domestic market.
134
In response, the SAIC and State Administration of Foreign Exchange
enacted "Provisional Rules for Mergers and Acquisitions of Domestic
Enterprises by Foreign Investors". 135 These rules limit the control that
foreign investors may attain in domestic companies.' 36 In the aggregate,
these acts
restrict anticompetitive behavior, but in limited and targeted
37
areas.

1

In 2004, MOFCOM established an anti-monopoly office with
greater enforcement power than previous agencies. 138 This agency
oversees enforcement of the AML, including investigating and
prosecuting violations. 139 In order to aptly provide incentives for open
market interactions, China will need further regulations. Unless the
AML is enacted, this antitrust agency will have minimal basis for
enforcement.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. The National Development and Reform Commission oversees strategic
economic planning and addresses social, infrastructure, and economic issues as well as
promulgates economic growth plans in order to increase economic activity. See Nat'l
Dev. and Reform Comm., Main Functions of the NDRC, http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/brief/
default.htm (last visited Jan. 12, 2006).
131. Provisional Rules for Monopoly Pricing (promulgated by the State Admin. for
Ind. & Commerce 1997).
132. Id.
133. Interim Provisions on Prohibiting Bid-Rigging (promulgated by the State Admin.
for Ind. & Commerce 1998).
134. State Administration on Foreign Exchange (SAFE) monitors and regulates
economic and financial transactions including trade regulations, foreign reserves, and
balance of payments, surpluses, and deficits. See Chinese Government Official Web
Portal, State Administration on Foreign Exchange, available at http://english.gov.cn/
2005-10/09/content_75318.htm (last visited Jan. 12, 2006).
135. Interim Provisions on Mergers and Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises by
Foreign Investors (promulgated by the State Admin. of Foreign Exchange 2003).
136. This was a valid concern as China's foreign trade increased by $311 billion from
1978-1998. Xinqiang Sun, supra note 96, at 21.
137. Id.
138. Yan Yang, Ministry Sets Up Anti-Monopoly Office, CHINA DAILY, Sept. 17,
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004-09/17/
at
available
2004,
content_37533 1.htm.
139. Id.
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IV. Proposed Anti-Monopoly
Law-"You like potato and I like
' 40
potahto.'
China has been working on an anti-monopoly law since 1996.141
The draft AML's purpose is to serve as a comprehensive antitrust law,
similar to Articles 81 and 82 of the European Union. 42 The draft version
of this law purports to address competition issues in general, not just
monopolies. 43 Additionally, the draft legislation tackles market
definition, price
fixing, conspiracies, monopolies, mergers, and penalties
144
violators.
for
The Chinese legislative process requires consent from numerous
sources. Most legislation is drafted by an administrative department
such as MOFCOM under the purview of the State Council, which
subsequently votes on approval of the regulation. 45 If approval is given,
the State Council records the measure to the Standing Committee of the
National People's Congress (NPC). 14 6 The Standing Committee is
composed of fifteen members 147 and acts as the legislative body when the
General Assembly is not in session. 148 A bill needs a majority vote1 49for
approval in both the Standing Committee and the General Assembly.
Scholars predicted that China would pass the AML in 2005 or late
2006.150 The May 2006 draft of the AML passed by the State Council on
June 7, 2006,151 was submitted to the Standing Committee for
consideration. 152 Presently, the Standing Committee has held the first of

140.

Louis ARMSTRONG & ELLA FITZGERALD, Let's Call the Whole Thing Off, on

LouiS AGAIN (Mobile Fidelity 1995) (1957).
141. Yee Wah Chin, The Final Stages of China's Anti-Monopoly Law,
http://www.asianresearch.org/articles/2921.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2006).
ELLA AND

142. Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty of Rome comprise the EU antitrust statutes and
establish anticompetitive activity within the European Union. See Treaty of Rome, supra

note 19, arts. 81, 82.
143. See 2006 Draft AML.
144. Id.
145. See Nat'l People's Cong. of China, China'sLegislative System, http://www.npc.
gov.cn/zgrdw/english/aboutCongress/aboutCongressDetail.jsp?id=Legislative
(last
visited Oct. 10, 2006).
146. Id.
147. People's
Daily
Online,
The
National
People's
Congress,
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/data/organs/npc.shtml (last visited Oct. 10, 2006).
148. Nat'l Peoples Cong., Functions and Powers of the Standing Committee,
http://www.npc.gov.cn/zgrdw/english/organization/committee/funcionAndPowers.jsp
(last visited July 18, 2007).
149. Id.
150. See, e.g., Harris, supra note 22, at 173.
151. Chin, supra note 141.
152. Press Release, Embassy of the PRC in the U.S.A., Chinese Government
Approves Draft of Anti-Monopoly Law (June 7, 2006), available at http://www.chinaembassy.org/eng/xw/t256891 .htm.
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1 53
three readings of a draft dated June 22, 2006 (Current Draft).
Previously, representatives from American Antitrust agencies met
with Chinese officials to provide advice and opinions with regard to the
language and enforcement of the AML.1 54 These meetings attempted to
explain the U.S. system and tried to influence AML drafters to adopt the
U.S. approach. In December 2006, Chinese officials met with American
enforcers and members of the legal community to discuss the provisions
of the current draft AML. 155 Despite best efforts by American enforcers,
the current draft closely resembles the EU antitrust laws; Articles 81 and
82.156 The Current Draft prohibits abuse of a dominant position, an EU

153. Lillian Yang, Anti-Monopoly Bill for Review, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST,
Nov. 7, 2006, at 1.
154. China has solicited feedback from the international antitrust community.
Members of the American Bar Association met with Chinese officials, reviewed the draft
AML and provided official comments. See H. Stephen Harris, Jr. & Kathy Lijun Yang,
China: Latest developments in Anti-Monopoly Law Legislation, 19 SPG ANTITRUST 89
(2005); see also Am. Bar Ass'n, Joint Comments of the American Bar Association's
Section of Antitrust Law, Section of Intellectual PropertyLaw & Section of International
Law on the Proposed Anti-Monopoly Law of the People's Republic of China, May 20,
2005,
available at http://www.abanet.org/intlaw/committees/business-regulation/
antitrust/abaprcat2005finalcombowapp.pdf (last visited July 18, 2007) [hereinafter Joint
Comments].
155. There were three conferences at different locations in the United States: Seattle,
WA, Washington D.C., and Cleveland, OH. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, US-China Legal
Exchange 2006, http://www.buyusa.gov/asianow/chinalegalexchange.html (last visited
Jan. 20, 2007).
156. EU Article 81 enumerates per se violations similar to Article VII of the AML.
EU Article 82 is comparable to the approach of AML articles 8, 9 and 12. Further,
Article 10 of the AML provides exemptions similar to those recognized by the EU
Directorate General for Competition. See 2006 Draft AML, arts. 6, 10, 11, 12; see also
Treaty of Rome, supra note 19, arts. 81, 82.
Table 1: Prohibited Actions by Jurisdiction
Article 81 EU
(a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or
selling prices or any other trading

Article VII AML
(i) fix, maintain or change prices
of products;

conditions;

(b) limit or control production, markets,
technical development, or investment;

(c) share markets or sources of supply;

(d) apply dissimilar conditions to
equivalent transactions with other trading
parties, thereby placing them at a
competitive isadvantage;

(ii) limit the production volume
or sales volume of products;
(iv) limit the purchase of new
technology, new facilities or
limit the development of new
products, new technology;
(iii) segment the sales markets or
the raw material purchasing
markets;
(v) jointly boycott transactions;

Sherman Act § 1
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term for monopolization, but with a lower threshold.for enforcement than
U.S. antitrust laws.157 Further, the format of the Articles resembles the
identifies prohibited
format of EU Articles 81 and 82 as it specifically
158
statute.
the
in
review
for
standards
and
practices
The Current Draft prohibits various forms of anticompetitive
behavior, and is not limited to monopolistic behavior. 159 The Current
Draft defines anticompetitive behavior, 160 mergers, 161 prevents
monopolization, 62 certain horizontal and vertical agreements, 163 and bid
rigging. 164 It establishes an anti-monopoly enforcement agency under the
State Council, 165 creates exemptions, 166 and fashions fines for
violators. 67 As written, the AML appears to further China's integration
into the global market economy through the provision of incentives for
competitive business practice.
Article 1 states that the purpose of the AML is to ensure
competition in economic activity.1 68 The article lists goals economists
are likely to recognize as open market characteristics, such as the
prevention and prohibition of monopolistic activities, economic
69
efficiency, consumer protection, and competitive business practices.1
(e) make the conclusion of contracts
subject to acceptance by the other parties
of supplementary obligations which, by
their nature or according to commercial
usage, have no connection with the
subject of such contracts,

(vi) other monopoly agreements
Antiby
the
determined
Monopoly Law enforcement
Authority.

contract,
Every
combination in the
form of trust or
otherwise,
or
conspiracy,
in
restraint of trade or
commerce among
the several States,
or with foreign
nations, is declared
to be illegal.

157. Europe and U.S. enforcers have different market share thresholds when assessing
anticompetitive behavior and effects. See ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note
49, at 243-45; see also supra text accompanying note 49.
158. Chin, supra note 141.
159. The Current Draft addresses anticompetitive behavior such as monopolization,
collusion, mergers and bid-rigging. See 2006 Draft AML.
160. Id.
161. Id.at arts. 15-21.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. 2006 Draft AML.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.at art. 1.
169. Article Iindicates the AML is
[Elnacted for the purposes of protecting market competition, preventing and
prohibiting monopolistic conduct, promoting efficiency of economic operation,
safeguarding the legitimate rights and interests of undertakings, consumers and
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Article 2 indicates that the AML is effective against all economic activity
conducted within China as well as activity conducted outside Chinese
170
borders having anticompetitive effects on China's domestic market.17
The Current Draft prohibits vertical and horizontal monopolies and
monopolistic agreements. 172 The AML determines a monopoly exists
under Article 14 when a firm has fifty percent market share, when two
joint undertakings have sixty-six percent of the market, or when three
joint undertakings have seventy-five percent market share. 173 Articles 3
and 8 define prohibited vertical monopolistic conduct 174 to include
collusive monopoly agreements, 175 abuse of dominant market
positions, 176 and "concentration of undertakings"'' 77 that eliminate or
restrict competition. 78 Article 7 curtails monopoly agreements between
180
competitors. 179 Prohibited economic activity includes price fixing,
output restrictions,' 8 ' market divisions,' 82 limitation on technological
advancement 83 and boycotts.' 84 Collusive bid rigging is prohibited
under Article 9.185
Articles 12 and 15 prohibit anticompetitive behavior from
undertakings 86 that have a dominant position in the market, but do not

public interests, and ensuring the healthy development of the socialist market
economy.
2006 Draft AML at Art. 1.
170. Id. at Art. 2 (indicating the AML is "applicable to monopolistic conduct outside
the territory of the People's Republic of China that have eliminative or restrictive effects
on competition in the domestic market of the People's Republic of China").
171. Id.
172. Article VII of the Current Draft prohibits horizontal agreements that constitute
price fixing, output restrictions, market divisions and boycotts. Id. at art. 7. Article VIII
prohibits anticompetitive vertical agreements such as resale price maintenance. Id. at art.
8.
173. Id. at art. 14, § 1.
174. Vertical agreements occur between two levels of a distribution chain, for
example, between a supplier and retailer. Horizontal agreements occur between
competitors on the same level of the distribution chain, for example, agreements between
manufacturers. See SULLIVAN & HOVENKAMP, supra note 41, at 187, 427.
175. 2006 Draft AML, art. 3, § 1.
176. Id. at art. 3, § 2.
177. Id. at art. 3,§ 3.
178. Id.
179. 2006 Draft AML, art. 7.
180. Id.at § 1.
181. Id.at § 2.
182. Id.at § 3.
183. Id.at § 4.
184. 2006 Draft AML, art. 7,§ 5.
185. Id.at art. 9.
186. Article 4 defines "undertaking" as any "natural person, legal person, other
organization that engages in manufacturing, selling products, or providing services in a
relevant market." 2006 Draft AML, art. 4.
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have monopoly power. 187 Article 12 defines dominant market position as
the ability to control price or output quantity and create or maintain entry
barriers in the relevant market.1 88 Article 15 expands this list to include
monopoly pricing,' 89 predatory pricing, 190 refusals to deal, 191 exclusive
dealings,' 92 tying arrangements' 93 and price discrimination.194 Dominant
as market
position is determined by factors listed in Article 13 such
95
shares, entry barriers, and interdependence of undertakings.
The Current Draft AML creates anti-monopoly agencies under the
direction of the State Council. 196 Articles 5 and 33 of the AML direct the
State Council to establish an "Anti-Monopoly Commission" to oversee
the implementation of Anti-Monopoly Law and work to coordinate
government actions on all levels.' 97 Article 5 also instructs the State
Council to establish an enforcement agency, deemed the "AntiMonopoly Law Enforcement Authority." 198 Article 34 grants the AntiMonopoly Law Enforcement Authority the power to enforce the AML
and control various ministries and agencies across China. 99 The AntiMonopoly Law Enforcement Authority has the ability to determine other
prohibited anticompetitive behavior beyond those activities listed in the
187. 2006 Draft AML, arts. 12, 15.
188. "Dominant Market Position" in this Law refers to a controlling market
position held by one undertaking or several undertakings as a whole which is
capable of controlling the price or quantity of products or other trading
conditions in the relevant market or restricting or affecting other undertakings
in entering into the relevant market.
2006 Draft AML, art. 12, § 1.
189. 2006 Draft AML, art. 15, at § 1.
190. Id. at § 2.
191. Id. at § 3.
192. Id. at § 4.
193. Id. at § 5.
194. 2006 Draft AML, art. 15, § 6.
195. Id. at art. 8, § 6.
196. Id. at arts. 1, 5, 33.
197. 2006 Draft AML, art. 5 ("The State Council shall set up the Anti-Monopoly
Commission. The Anti-Monopoly Commission of the State Council shall be responsible
to organize, lead, and harmonize the anti-monopoly work.").
198. According to Article 5 of the current draft, the Anti-Monopoly Enforcement
Authority will be able to control all government agencies in any province in order to
enforce the AML. See art. 5.
The authority responsible for the Anti-Monopoly Law enforcement appointed
by the State Council (hereinafter "the Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement
Authority") shall be in charge of the work of Anti-Monopoly Law enforcement
pursuant to this Law. According to necessity, the Anti-Monopoly Law
Enforcement Authority under the State Council can authorize the
corresponding organs of the People's Government of provinces, autonomous
regions, municipalities to be in charge of Anti-Monopoly Law enforcement
works pursuant to the Law.
Id.
199. 2006 Draft AML, art. 34.
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AML.2 °°
The final article of relevance to SOEs is Article 10, which provides
Article 10 provides
exemptions for certain economic activities. 20 '
exemptions from the AML as long as the economic actor proves that the
monopolistic conduct does "not substantially eliminate competition in
the relevant market ' 20 2 and provides public benefit such as technological
20 5
20 4
3
production efficiencies,
advancement, 20 research and development,
public interest measures, 20 6 increased foreign trade 20 7 and mitigated
effects of a depression.20 8 It appears economic behavior that is not
grossly anticompetitive will be governed under the rule of reason
presented by Article 10.209 It is likely that behavior falling into this
category will be given a favorable rating and thus exempt from AML
enforcement.
V.

210
Post-Enactment Enforcement of the AML-"Games People Play"

China has indicated it will pass the AML.21 It remains unclear
whether China is enacting regulations for economic gain or to assuage
Western concerns. This section identifies barriers to AML enforcement
and analyzes reasons the Chinese approaches may be different than those
advocated by the United States.
A.

DoctrinalObstacles to Enforcement

The United States Supreme Court has recognized two exemptions
for government economic involvement in the free market. The first is an
exclusion for federal executive agencies,2 12 and the second precludes
federal action from antitrust liability.2 13

200.

See id. at art. 7, § 6. The scope and powers of the Anti-Monopoly Commission

and the Anti-Monopoly Enforcement Authority are delineated in Articles 32-44. Id.
201. 2006 Draft AML, art. 10.

202.

Id.

203.
204.

Id. at § 1.
Id.

205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.

Id. at § 2.
2006 Draft AML, art. 10, at § 4.
Id. at art. 10, § 5.
Id. at art. 10, § 6.
See id. at art. 10.
HANK WILLIAMS JR., Games People Play, on I'M ONE OF YOU (Curb Records

2003).

211. Id.
212. See USPS v. Flamingo, 540 U.S. 736, 747 (2004).
213. Also known as the State Action Doctrine promulgated by Parker v. Brown, 317
U.S. 341 (1943).
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Exemption for Federal Agencies

In America, the United States Postal Service (USPS) functions like
a state-owned enterprise.214 Like typical SOEs, the USPS was created by
federal law.215 USPS is financed and controlled by the federal
government and driven by non-profit incentives.2 16 Although the USPS
may have market power in some areas of the country,2 17 it competes
directly with private companies, such as Federal Express, United Parcel
Service, and DHL.2 18 Due to competition with those corporations, in
most U.S. markets, the USPS is not a monopoly. 21 9 However, in a recent
case, a plaintiff alleged that USPS was a monopoly and should be subject
to antitrust laws.22 °
The Court rejected this contention, 221 holding instead that the
Sherman Act applied to "persons" such as corporations, 222 and
specifically noted that USPS was not a federal corporation, 223 could not
set prices 224 and was not a market actor separate from the United
States. 5 In rejecting these antitrust claims, the Court held, entities that

214. Sappington & Sidak, supra note 70, at 499-02.
215. See 1 Stat. 354. Congress officially established the post office on May 8, 1794.
See United States Postal Service, The United States PostalService; An American History
1775-2002, http://www.usps.com/cpim/ftp/pubs/publ00/publ00.htm#thepostal.
(last
visited Jan. 20, 2007).
216. USPS v. Flamingo, 540 U.S. 736, 747 (2004).
217. In some remote areas in which other postal providers such as Federal Express,
UPS and DHL do not have extensive coverage, like Montana. USPS has a non-profit
mandate to deliver mail to every residence in the country. Other providers are limited by
profit concerns. See id. at 747.
The Postal Service has different goals, obligations, and powers from private
corporations. Its goals are not those of private enterprise. The most important
difference is that it does not seek profits, but only to break even, 39 U.S.C.
§ 3621, which is consistent with its public character. It also has broader
obligations, including the provision of universal mail delivery, the provision of
free mail delivery to certain classes of persons, §§ 3201-3405, and, most
recently, increased public responsibilities related to national security.
Id.
218. While USPS competes for consumers, it cannot lower prices in response to
competitors' actions. See id. 747-48.
219. In most locations, USPS is not the sole provider of mail services, does not
possess market power and lacks the ability to raise prices. See POSNER, supra note 31, at
276-78 (discussing elements of a monopoly).
220. See Flamingo, 540 U.S. 736 (2004).
221. Id.at 748.
222. "The word 'person' ... shall be deemed to include corporations and associations
existing under ...the laws of... the United States." Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 7;
Flamingo 540 U.S. at 744.
223. USPS v. Flamingo, 540 U.S. 736 (2004).
224. Id. at 747.
225. Id. at 744.
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are "independent establishments of the executive branch" 226 are
considered a part of the federal government and are exempt from
antitrust liability. 27 Because the Court held that the USPS was not
separate from the federal government, it determined that the USPS is not
a "person" as defined by the Sherman Act and immune from antitrust
claims.22 8 Thus, the Court held that agencies of the federal government
are immune from antitrust liability.
The USPS holding could have significant parallels in China. While
229
most SOEs in China compete with private industries, many are still
financed and controlled by governmental administrative agencies 230 and
could be considered a part of the government.23' If China imports the
USPS precedent into its proposed AML, it may be interpreted as not
applicable to government entities, thereby eliminating SOE liability.
Exclusion of these entities from the AML may result in the proposal
becoming largely ineffective in assisting China's transition to a freemarket economy.
2.

Government Economic Activity

The second governmental exemption of governmental economic
development recognized by the Supreme Court is the state action
doctrine. In Parker v. Brown, 232 the Supreme Court held that the
Sherman Act was "not intended to restrain state action., 233 According to
the Doctrine, when the state chooses to intervene in the market, 234 private
parties acting pursuant to the state's "clearly expressed policy '235 and
subject to state supervision 236 are immune from antitrust challenges. 237 If
China were to adopt this doctrine, it may interpret the act of creating and
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. USPS v. Flamingo, 540 U.S. 736 (2004).
229. See Johns, supra note 64, at 919-20.
230. Id.
231. If China follows the logic of Flamingo where the Supreme Court held that USPS
is an executive agency, thus considered part of the federal government. See Flamingo,
540 U.S. at 737-38.
232. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
233. Id.at351.
234. According to the laissez-faire doctrine, the government intervenes in the event of
market failure. See O'CONNOR, supra note 32, at 47-48; see also supra text
accompanying note 32. The key element to the state action doctrine is that the
government is consciously choosing to enter the market with the purpose of regulation.
SeeBrown, 317 U.S. 341.
235. California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97
(1980) (citing City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 410,
(1978)).
236. Id.
237. Id.at4lO.
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The "clear policy

239

rationale can arguably be supported by a national goal of a robust
economy, full employment, and economic competitiveness on a global
scale. Similarly, China could argue its control over SOEs amounts to
adequate supervision. 240 Adopting this doctrine will hinder attempts at
full and effective implementation and enforcement of the provisions in
the AML.
China may use the rationale 24 1 of these doctrines to fashion an
exemption for its state interests, such as SOEs. If China chooses to do
so, the movement away from government intervention and toward
government regulation and competition laws may be significantly
stymied. Even if the current version of the AML is enacted, enforcement
may be weak. If China allows the anticompetitive effects of SOEs to
exist, it will adversely affect China's integration into the global
marketplace.
B.

Implementation Strategies: Game Theory Analysis

Once China passes the AML, there are a variety of available
implementation strategies. Determining the best course of action will be
a product of China's preference and payoffs.242 In order to determine the
best strategy, some economists apply a game theory analysis.243
Game theory seeks to determine the choice that an individual actor
244
will choose
Assuming that the actor 246
acts
245 in any given situation.
rationally

and has knowledge of each option and the payoffs,

a

238. China would argue that state control over industry advances social welfare
policies, such as safe mines in the coal industry. See Wehrfritz, supra note 27.
239. See Midcal Aluminum, Inc. 445 U.S. 97, (citing Louisiana Power & Light Co.,
435 U.S. at 410).
240. State managerial control and operation enables China to supervise activity of

SOEs. See generally Wehrfritz, supra note 27.
241. I do not presume that China would wholesale import U.S. style exemptions,
especially since the Current Draft of the AML reflects EU style enforcement.
242. See WILLIAM C. CHARON, THE LOGIC OF STRATEGIC DECISION: GAME THEORY
FOR MORAL & POLITICAL PHILOSOPHERS 2-4 (2004).

243. Economists such as John Nash have used strategic behavior analysis to
determine the best move available to an actor based on the actions of his competitors.
See TOM SIEGFRIED, A BEAUTIFUL MATH: JOHN NASH, GAME THEORY, AND THE MODERN
QUEST FOR A CODE OF NATURE (2006). For more reading on game theory see DOUGLAS
BAID, GAME THEORY AND THE LAW (1994), RICHARD ROUSE GAME DESIGN: THEORY &
PRACTICE (2nd ed. 2004), and WILLIAM C. CHARON, THE LOGIC OF STRATEGIC DECISION:
GAME THEORY FOR MORAL & POLITICAL PHILOSOPHERS (2004).

244.

CHARON, supra note 242, at 1.

245. According to game theory, a player acts rationally when he or she chooses a
course of action that "maximizes the satisfaction" of the actors' preferences and beliefs of
corresponding payoffs. Id. at 20-21. Further, a decision is only rational if it suffices
cognitive and practical consistency. Id. at 17-20.
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player will make choices based on his own preferences and available
payoffs of each outcome. 247 Preferences allow an actor to rank different
outcomes in relation to one another.248 Preferences are a function of
morals, 249 pleasure, 250 avoidance of pain, 25 1 traditions and cultural
customs, 252 as well as economic rewards. 253 An actor will choose the
strategy resulting in the outcome that maximizes payoffs in light of his or
her preferences.254
The process of transitioning from a command economy2 5" to a
market economy involves many decision nodes 256 with multiple actors.
China will choose a course in response to its own preferences, to the
257
actions of environmental actors and to their corresponding payoffs.
For example, arguably China has decided to transition to a market
economy based on treaties, regulations and international economic
objectives by joining the WTO. 25 8 This Comment analyzes a part of the
sub-game of implementing the AML by limiting the game to three
decision nodes: passage, enforcement of the AML, and application to
SOEs.2 59
1.

Decision Node A: To Pass or Not Pass the AML

China's decision to pass the Anti-Monopoly Law will be a function
246. Payoffs are the value of an outcome of any particular action based on the
preferences of the actor. Id. at 12. Preferences are the values that an actor assigns to an
outcome in relation to each other. Id. at 1. For example, preferences are expressed as
favoring A over B. Outcomes are expressed by valuations of each outcome such as
placing a value of 90 on A and 10 on B.
247. Id. at 1.
248. CHARON, supra note 242, at 14-15.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. CHARON, supra note 242, at 14.
254. As preferences change, so do the payoffs for each outcome. Thus, the "best"
strategy for a player changes. See id. at 12.
255. See O'CONNOR, supra note 32, at 47-48; see also supra text accompanying note
83.
256. A decision node is a point within a game where one actor chooses one course of
action over another. For example, the passage of the AML is a decision node for China
as China has a choice to pass or reject the AML. See CHARON, supra note 242, at 7-8.
257. In this case, "environment" refers to the environment of the game in which
strategic choice is decided. Environmental actors include economic, political, national,
and others. CHARON, supra note 242, at 5.
258. Decisions on course of action indicate the preferences and interests of the actor.
See id. at 13. China has decided to join the WTO and has enacted economic competition
regulations which indicate that China values the payoffs of a socialist style market
economy.
259. The game is graphically represented as follows:
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of its preferences and the corresponding outcomes.26 ° China's preference
to pass the AML will be based on the value assigned to government
regulation of the economy. Underlying China's valuation of outcomes
are the fundamental views of its market actors. 26 1 The United States has
adopted an "individual capitalistic" approach that leaves economic
activity in the hands of market actors. 62 Although there has been an
extensive government role in the U.S. economy, 263 a widespread
acceptance of laissez-faire economics 264 and a growing distrust of
government action have created a bias against government involvement
in the economy. 265 TteUi
In the United States, the divorce of government and
the economic market was reestablished in the deregulation of industry
under the Reagan Administration in the mid-late 1980s. 266
Although U.S. economic policy rejects extensive government
involvement and prefers a market-driven economy, the U.S. antitrust
laws value competition within limits. 267 Current U.S. economic policy
recognizes business, that when left to its own practices, can be

Don 't 'AP5\

,
fO
'1 e

Don't Enforce

Don't Pass b

pply BCE

dl0 C Enforce

_ a Pass

260. A decision to pass an Anti-Monopoly law presumes a prior decision to open the
economy.
261. Views of other players and environmental factors affect the preferences of an
outcome. See id. at 5, 12-13.
262. See O'CONNOR, supra note 32, at 44-49; see also supra text accompanying note
32.
263. For example, the Public Work Acts of the Great Depression Era, Lyndon
Johnson's Great Society legislation as well as government regulation prior to the Regan
Era.
264. Laissez-faire economics values economic activity to occur with minimal, or
absence of government intervention. Market actors through competition determine what
is produced and purchased based on the laws of supply and demand. See SMITH, supra
note 32.
265. Clyde 0. Ruggles, Government Control of Business (1945), reprinted in
ANTITRUST AND REGULATION 349 (Giles H. Burgess, Jr. ed. 1992).

266. President Reagan initiated reforms that led to the deregulation of banks and the
transportation industry, notably airlines. See Daniel K. Bubb, The Successes and
Failures of PresidentialPolicy on Commercial Air Travel, 71 J. AIR L. & COM. 653,
665-66 (2006); see also John C. Panzar, Regulation, Deregulation and Economic
Efficiency: The Case of the CAB (1980), reprinted in ANTITRUST AND REGULATION 415

(Giles H. Burgess, Jr. ed. 1992).
267. The United States has adopted a capitalistic economic approach.
O'CONNOR, supra note 32.

See
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anticompetitive and thus is in need of regulation.268 In this capacity, the
government acts as a referee, not a manager. 269 Regulation in the form of
clear guidelines accentuates beneficial aspects of market interaction and
limits corruption. 270 Due to this preference, the U.S. values market
activity with boundary regulations, and would likely choose to pass the
AML.
It is important to note that player preferences change over time,
resulting in different strategies in different periods. 27 1 Historically,
China has valued government control of the economy.272 According to
Maoist economics, the State is the optimal vehicle for economic
growth.27 3 Choosing to open the market would result in a loss of
government control, possibly leading to undesirable economic
stratifications. 74 Based on these preferences, it appears that China
would choose to preserve government control and choose not to pass the
AML.
In light of recent history, China seems to be shifting its preference
from a strong government role in the economy to a market driven by
competition.275 This is illustrated through China's efforts to attract
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI),276 the formation of closer diplomatic
ties with the U.S., 2 77 as well as accession to the WTO. 278 In addition,
268. Id. at 32.
269. Laissez-faire economics mandates that government involvement in the economy
is only warranted to set macroeconomic parameters that allow a market to exist and to
only intervene in cases of market failure. See SMITH, supra note 32.
270. Antitrust laws provide incentives for fair business practices resulting in
beneficial outcomes such as efficiency, equilibrium pricing, and welfare benefits. See
LETWIN, supra note 35.
271. See CHARON, supra note 242, at 12-13.
272. See WEDEMAN, supranote 86, at 4-6.
273. See id.
274. "Opening a market" refers to removal of governmental limitations on market
interactions and allows competition to govern economic transactions. See Blumenthal,
supra note 22, at 200-02. Inherently, competition reduces government control. Id.
275. See Berry, supra note 87, at 134-35.
276. In 2003, China attracted $52.7 billion dollars in Foreign Direct Investment.
Simon Cartledge, The Other Side of China's Success Story, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2003, at
11. The increase in Foreign Direct Investment is partly attributed to China's accession to
the WTO and other measures reducing restrictions on foreign investment such as the
Interim Provisions on Mergers and Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign
Investors (promulgated by the State Administration of Foreign Exchange 2003). Id.
277. In December 2001, China received permanent normal trade relations status from
the United States effective January 1, 2002. Press Release, White House Office of the
Press Sec'y, President Grants Permanent Trade Status to China (Dec. 27, 2001),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/12/20011227-1.htnl.
at
available
Further, President Bush has met with Chinese President Jiang Zemin on at least two
occasions. Press Release, White House Office of the Press Sec'y, PresidentBush Meets
1, 2001), available at
with Chinese President Jiang Zemin, (June
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02/20020221-7.html.
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China is instituting economic reforms such as the AML to allow
administrative agencies to oversee different aspects of the economy.2 79
Further, the current legislative status of the AML, including the
presentation of the draft to the international community seems to indicate
China's desire to align with U.S. preferences of government
regulation.28 °
For China, the payoffs of passing the AML include increased
Foreign Direct Investment, 281 most-favored nation status (a benefit of
joining the WTO),282 increased product markets,283 and availability of
global resources.284 Failure to pass the AML may result in forbearance
of these benefits.285 (Strategy b, Outcome 1). Therefore, it seems
beneficial to China to pass the AML. (Strategy a).
2.

Decision Node B: Actively Enforce AML

China's preference to enforce the AML will be determined in part
by the cultural value of Guanxi.2 86 Guanxi refers to the system of social
networking in which trust is integral to any business transaction.28 7
Reputation and character are integral in ensuring that business
interactions occur along social lines. 288 Accordingly, under Guanxi,
278. China acceded to the WTO in 2002. See World Trade Organization, Ministerial
Decision of 10 November 2001, WT/L/432, available at http://www.mac.doc.gov/
China/ProtocolandDecision.pdf (last visited Nov. 7, 2006).
279. Assisting MOFCOM and SAIC in regulating economic activity, China is also
creating a separate antitrust agency. See Yang, supra note 138.
280. However, the role of government is currently being debated. The question is
whether to maintain Maoist practices or deviate and fully embrace U.S. or EU agency
regulation systems or a hybrid of both. See Berry, supra note 87, at 134-35.
281. World Trade Org., 10 Top Benefits of the WTO Trading System,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/whatise/l0bene/lObOOe.htm (last visited Jan.
12, 2006).
282. Most favored trade status refers to favorable trade relations, such as lower tariffs
and increased quotas. See id. A member country in the WTO must extend any favorable
trade status with one country to all member states. Id.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Usually, once an actor chooses a course of action at a decision node, that choice
cannot be revisited. Each decision results in a different outcome with unique payoffs.
See CHARON, supra note 242, at 12-13. Thus, choosing not to pass the AML will result
in a different outcome and China will not realize the same payoffs available as passing
the AML.
286. In the following analysis, I attempt to apply the concept of Guanxi to preference
formulation. Admittedly, I have no firsthand knowledge of Chinese business culture. I
have attempted to control for "white-washing" as much as possible. For an in depth
study of Guanxi and Corporate China, see Udo C. Braendle et. al., Corporate
Governance in China- Is Economic Growth PotentialHindered by Guanxi?, 110 Bus.
Soc. REv. 389, 389-05 (2005).
287. Id. at 390.
288. Id.

2007]

"TAIN'T WHAT You

Do"

business ventures are more a function of relationships than profits.289
Under such practices, the probability of corruption increases.29 ° Indeed,
Guanxi can be used to further cronyism, or "kick-backs," to close friends
and business partners.29' While the government may take official action
in passing laws, social networks provide alternative routes to bypass
government statutes.292
Although Guanxi can facilitate corrupt practices, it primarily stands
for interconnected relationships.2 93 In a regulation context, this implies
that an antitrust enforcer needs to have integral knowledge of the
company's inter-working. 294 It appears that without an existing
relationship, in which the company trusts the knowledge and character of
a regulator, third-party enforcement would have limited success. 29 5 In an
antitrust context, Guanxi may be equated to collusion.29 6 In
China,
297
collusion is deemed to be inherent in cultural business practices.
American antitrust policy prefers to penalize collaboration.298
American regulation seems to emphasize neutral third-party
enforcement, leaving a regulator with little or no ties to the regulated
industry. 299 In utilities regulation for example, an official must not have
any ties with the utility.30 Politicians' business ties are scrutinized
according to the same standard, where close connections are
discouraged. 30 '
These contrasting views
impact preferences of
30 2
enforcement and lead to different outcomes.
289.
290.
291.
292.

Seeid. at 393.
Id. at 390-91.
Braendle, supra note 286, at 401.
Id. at 399.

293. See CHINESE CULTURE, ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR, AND INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESS MANAGEMENT 44-46 (ed. Ilan Alon) (2003) [hereinafter Alon].

294. See id.
295. See id. This raises the issue of allegiances. Will regulators choose to strictly
enforce the law against colleagues and friends?
296. See John H. Matheson, Convergence, Culture and Contract Law in China, 15
MINN. J.INT'L L. 329 (2006). Generally collusion between competitors is regarded as
anticompetitive behavior due to the likelihood of illegal agreements such as price fixing,
market allocations and cartelization. See O'CONNOR, supra note 32, at 119.
297. See Alon, supra note 293.
298. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (forbidding agreements and collaboration between competitors
and expressly declaring that anticompetitive contracts and conspiracies are illegal).
299. To prevent corruption, federal ethics rules require government employees to
disclose any connections with the industry they primarily regulate. See, e.g., Standards of
Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Executive Branch, 5 C.F.R. § 2635 (2002),
available at http://www.usoge.gov/pages/forms-pubs-otherdocs/fpofiles/reference/
rfsoc_02.txt.
300. Interview with John Lopatka, Professor of Law, The Dickinson School of Law of
the Pennsylvania State University, in University Park, Pa. (Nov. 2, 2006).
301. For example, U.S. Vice President Richard Cheney has received considerable
criticism from his association with Halliburton.
302. Preferences of an actor govern choice at each decision node, which leads to

PENN STATE INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26:1

The nature of the final language will signify China's preference on
enforcement. Specific language of the AML may signify greater
enforcement, while broader language may facilitate greater discretion in
enforcement.3 °3 The difference between the United States and European
Commission illuminates this difference.30 4 The Sherman Act uses
language that is purposely broad, in order to provide enforcement
flexibility.3 °5 As a result, there has been 100 years of judicial
interpretation on both sides of any given economic analysis.30 6 This
the
flexible jurisprudence has provided the Department of Justice 30and
7
Federal Trade Commission discretion in enforcing antitrust laws.
In contrast, Article 81 of the EU lays out specific violations. 30 8 Any
activity that violates Article 81 is deemed illegal per se and automatically
void 30 9 and activities that fall under the purview of Article 82 are
reviewed for legality. 310 It appears that Articles 81 and 82 provide little
discretion for enforcement in comparison to the Sherman Act.311 In both
cases, legislative intent on enforcement may be signified through
statutory language.3 12
The Chinese AML will be enacted by the General Assembly and
enforced by administrative agencies, such as the new antitrust agency.31 3
Since the General Assembly of the NPC is not currently in session, in
order for the General Assembly to consider the AML, the legislation
different outcomes. See CHARON, supra note 242, at 12; see also supra text
accompanying note 240.
303. See Berry, supranote 87, at 148-49.
304. Compare E.U. Articles 81 and 82 with U.S. Sherman Act. See Treaty of Rome,
supra note 19, at arts. 81, 82.
305. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 ("Every contract, combination ... or conspiracy, in restraint of
trade.., is declared to be illegal."). This does not specifically identify practices.
306. In deciding the applicable standard for horizontal and vertical restraints, the
Supreme Court initially adopted a per se illegality approach. See RAYBOULD & FIRTH,
supra note 48, at 24-27. In the twentieth century the Court shifted to a Rule of Reason
approach which considers relevant factors such as market power and anticompetitive
effects in determining legality of an action. Id.
307. The Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission have prosecutorial
discretion to enforce the antitrust laws. Interview with John Lopatka, supra note 300.
308. See Treaty of Rome, supra note 19, art. 81 (defining price fixing, supply
controls, geographic market divisions, predatory pricing, and tying arrangements as
illegal).
309. Id. ("Any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to this Article shall be
automatically void."), available at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/
legislation/articles.html (last visited July 18, 2007).
310. Id. at art. 82.
311. Articles 81 and 82 directly list prohibited anticompetitive acts while the Sherman
Act generally prohibits actions that "restrain trade." See id. at arts. 81, 82; see also supra
Table 1 accompanying note 156.
312. See Berry, supranote 87, at 148-49.
313. See Current Draft, at art. 5 (establishing the Anti-Monopoly Enforcement
Authority).
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must first be passed by the Standing Committee. 3 14 In one view, the
General Assembly is a rubber stamp for the Standing Committee. 315 At
any time during consideration of a bill, the Standing Committee can hold
special meetings to discuss the measure and then report its decisions or
propose amendments to the General Assembly at large.316 Historically,
the members of the General Assembly and Standing Committee were
members of the Communist party.317 Party loyalty still prevailed in 2000
when Li Peng, chairman of the NPC championed a "party-first"
platform. 318 Theoretically, the preferences of the CCP may manifest
during the formation and approval of legislation and these preferences
are translated into enacted legislation.319 If the party prefers not to
enforce the AML, the language of the AML will most likely reflect that
preference.
Should China choose to actively enforce the AML (Strategy ac),
there will be significant economic costs, bureaucratic costs, and
benefits. 320 The resulting enforcement of the AML will require a
developed judiciary, administrative enforcement agencies, national
regulations, increased enforcers, and channels of communication
between business and government. 32 1 The United States has developed a
working system that may serve as a model for China. 2
314. See Nat'l People's Cong. of China, Organizationinformation: Proceduresof the
National People's Congress Sessions,
http://www.npc.gov.cnlzgrdw/english/
organization/congress/procedureNPC.jsp (last visited Jan. 12, 2006); see also China's
Official Gateway to Information, What is the legislative process of the NationalPeople's
Congress? http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/56976.htm (last visited Jan. 20,
2007).
315. See TONY SAICH, GOVERNANCE AND POLITICS OF CHINA 115-16 (2001).
316. See National's People Congress of China, supra note 314; see also China's
Official Gateway to Information, supra note 314.
317. See SAICH, supra note 315, at 115-16.
318, Id.
319. See generally id. at 113-18.
320. Economic costs refer to opportunity costs. See O'CONNOR, supra note 32, at 10.
The costs of privatizing SOEs will be compared to the value of social and economic
welfare produced by maintaining status quo. Bureaucratic costs in this context refer to
expenses such as operation costs of the Anti-Monopoly Enforcement Agency. See
generally, SULLIVAN & HOVENKAMP, supra note 41, at 46-51. Enforcement of the AML
may result in economic benefits such as increased FDI, favorable trade status with
foreign companies, efficiency gains, and increases to consumer surplus.
321. The AML will not aid China's transition unless it is enforced. In order for
enforcement to occur, China needs the infrastructure to evaluate, regulate, and adjudicate
economic behavior. See SAICH, supra note 315, at 109-10. The current AML establishes
the Anti-Monopoly Enforcement Agency and authorizes it to work with all branches of
government to enforce the AML. See 2006 Draft AML, art. 5.
322. There are four primary actors in the U.S. antitrust enforcement arena: the
Department of Justice, the Federal Trade Commission, State Attorneys General and
private citizens. Throughout this Comment, I have focused on a few of the many
different policies the United States has adopted, but the discussion is not exhaustive.
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A key element of the U.S. system is the Freedom of Information
which requires decisions of administrative agencies to be
published.3 24 There is also a trend to publish all judicial proceedings.325
In order to be effective, businesses need to know what type of
competitive business conduct is prohibited.326 Currently, China does not
have a publishing requirement. 32 7 However, a provision in the AML
would require publication of any decisions of State agencies and judicial
opinions. 328 This should lead to increased information, which is an
essential element in a market economy. 329 Asymmetrical information
can result in market distortions as consumers will be unable to discern
true quality and price information and therefore may reduce transactions
for fear of overpaying or purchasing a lemon. 330 Therefore, it appears
that China should pass the AML with Article 15 in order to promote
competitive economic activity.
If these measures are adopted, enforcing the AML will be in
China's best interest. It remains to be seen whether the passing of the
AML will merely be to assuage Western concerns and attract Foreign
Direct Investment 331 or will actually have the effect of furthering
economic reform. Choosing not to enforce (Strategy ad, Outcome 2),
will result in minimal change to the status quo.332
Act 32 3

3.

Decision Node C: Application of the AML to SOEs

On its face, it seems that China would not enforce anti-monopoly

323. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552.
324. 5 U.S.C. § 552(2)(A).
325. Most judicial opinions are published through the West reporter system, or
available through electronic databases. See, e.g., 207 PA CODE § 2/201 (1996).
However, there is not a mandatory publishing requirement for judicial opinions. See
United States v. Pajooh, 143 F.3d 203, 204 (5th Cir. 1998) ("In general decisions
regarding publication.., is driven by whether a full opinion will benefit the bench, bar or
litigants.").
326. See Stephen Harris, Jr., An Overview of the Draft China Antimonopoly Law, 34
GA. J. INT'L COMP. L. 131, 140 (2005).
327. See Blumenthal, supra note 22, at 234-36.
328. Article 15 of the Current Draft mandates publication of enforcement decisions.
Art. 15. ("The Anti-monopoly Law Enforcement Authority under the State Council shall
publish the decision prohibiting the concentration or the decision attaching restrictive
conditions to the concentration in time.").
329. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 42, at 37.
330. See id. at 47.
331. Foreign Direct Investment refers to foreign governments or businesses investing
in the local economy through capital shares, corporate ownership, or joint ventures. See
THUN, supra note 97, at 3-8.
332. If the AML is passed but not enforced, there will be limited incentive for
businesses to continue the transition to a competitive market such as privatization of
SOEs.
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laws against state owned enterprises. 333 However, there has been
pressure from abroad,334 as well as increasing desire within China to
reform SOEs.335 In order to be effective, the AML will have to be
33
enforced against local governments. 336
Local governments may be
reluctant to relinquish control of SOEs.337 Implementing the AML will
require the cooperation of local governments in removing preferential
treatment for SOEs.
Facially, Article 50 appears applicable only to administrative
agencies and not to SOEs. 3 38 Though the Current Draft AML prohibits
certain behavior and specific actors, the absence of a particular provision
339
does not appear to indicate an exemption for anticompetitive behavior.
Therefore, SOEs that engage in anticompetitive behavior will be subject
to the AML. Conversely, SOEs may solicit refuge under Article 10
alleging that their conduct is necessary in order to provide production
efficiencies or increase foreign trade.34 °
The payoffs of each outcome will determine whether China will
choose to enforce the AML against SOEs. There are substantial reasons
to not enforce the AML against SOEs.341 Since SOEs focus on growth
and employment and not on profitability, they have functioned as public
work projects, creating employment opportunities that otherwise might
not exist. 342 China has started SOE reform through such measures as
privatization and "stockification",34 3 but these measures have had little

333. The CCP interest of control over microeconomic activity seems to conflict with
new competitive policies such as the AML. See generally Wehrfritz, supra note 27.
334. See Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, OECD
Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises (2005), available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/46/51/3480321 l.pdf (last visited Jan. 20, 2007).
335. See SOE Reform Heads in Right Direction, CHINA DAILY, Sept. 30, 2004,
available at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004-09/30/content_379106.htm.
336. This raises federalism problems. See Zhu Suli, 'Federalism' in Contemporary
China: A Reflection on the Allocation of Power Between Centraland Local Government,
7 SING. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 1 (2003).
337. Id.
338. Article 50 prohibits administrative agencies or public organizations from
engaging in anti-competitive behavior. Current Draft, art. 50.
339. Article 7 reserves the right of the Anti-monopoly Enforcement Authority to
determine other prohibited acts not otherwise itemized. Art. 7, § 6 ("other monopoly
agreements determined by the Anti-Monopoly Law enforcement Authority."). Further,
the draft AML outlines criteria for granting exemptions. See art. 10.
340. See id. at art. 10. Article 10 provides exemptions from AML enforcement
provided that competition is not reduced and that there are gains to consumer welfare.
341. See Berry, supra note 87, at 145-47 (describing the Self-Amputation theorem
and postulating why China may be hesitant to "cut-off' SOEs from existing protection
measures through active enforcement of the AML).
342. See Blumenthal, supra note 22, at 221-26.
343. Id.
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effect on SOE's efficiency, profitability, or market power.344
The AML will need to proscribe methods of dealing with SOEs that
operate as monopolies. U.S. style antitrust enforcement would result in
breaking the SOE into smaller units. 345 Due to the role of collusion in
current Chinese business practice, the significance of such action is
companies might simply operate as a cartel rather
debatable, as smaller
346
than a monopoly.
In order to achieve the goals of the AML, the benefits of
competition created by effective enforcement must outweigh the losses
sustained by the demise of SOEs. Quantitatively, the AML's effects
need to result in a greater or equal shift of benefits from those achieved
under inefficient SOEs 34 7 to productive, competitive benefits created
through open market interactions.348 More importantly, the Chinese
populace must realize that they will not be worse off without SOE
support. 349 Barriers to enforcement3 50 may be reduced as long as people
believe that the SOE job they lose will be replaced by an effective
substitute under the AML.351 In addition, each stakeholder in the
352
Chinese marketplace needs to believe that change is in its best interest.
Unless this idea is communicated effectively, preferences will not
change, and there will be considerable support to maintain SOEs free of
AML interference.35 3
Conversely, if the AML is not applied to SOEs, global business may
view it as an anti-foreign company act. In this regard, the AML may
344. Id.
345. See, e.g., United States v. AT&T, 524 F. Supp. 1336, 1372 (D.D.C. 1981)
(American Telephone and Telegraph Company ("AT&T") consent decree in which
AT&T was forced to divest into four separate companies).
346. In a market where all firms have close relationships, the firms may have a
tendency to collude to either decrease costs or increase profits. Though individually,
firms do not possess market power, collectively as a cartel, the firms can fix prices and
restrict output in a segment of the market. Interview with Susan Beth Farmer, Professor
of Law, The Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania State University, in
University Park, Pa. (Jan. 23, 2007).
347. Such as social welfare compensation packages including employment
opportunities, retirement packages, and health care. See Johns, supra note 64.
348. See Blumenthal, supra note 22, at 221-26.
349. Ultimately, in a democratic society, elected officials need the support of the
electorate. See WILLIAM FLANIGAN & NANCY ZINGALE, POLITICAL BEHAVIOR OF THE
AMERICAN ELECTORATE 1-3 (8th ed. 1994). If the populace does not believe that they
will benefit from AML enforcement, then they might pressure their leaders to change the
law or elect new leaders.
350. Such as local government's refusal to cooperate and corruption. See Berry,
supra note 87, at 149-50.
351. Id.
352. In game theory terms, outcome 4 is better than outcome 3, see supra illustration
note 259.
353. This places a huge burden on effective communication by enactors of the AML.
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354
serve to protect domestic firms at the expense of foreign companies.
This may signify that China is skeptical that foreign investors will usurp
a large role in its economy and that China intends to maintain a strong
control of its economic activity.355 This may result in foreign investors
avoiding investment in China if such steps are seen as favoring Chinese
business. 356 Historically, China has placed an emphasis on non-profit
motivations.357 However, the current trend in Chinese trade policies
reflects that China prefers to engage in international trade and increase
GDP.
The analysis above indicates that the best outcome for China is to
follow Strategy ace (Outcome 4). Therefore, China should pass the
AML, actively enforce the law and apply the law to SOEs. This decision
could lead to increased economic growth and greater acceptance on the
world stage. To follow any other strategy will result in a stagnation of
China's economic transition, hinder efforts to reform SOEs, and the loss
of economic opportunities.35 8
359
VI. Conclusion-"It's the Way that Cha Do it"

In summary, China will choose to enact and implement the AML
based on its cultural, social and economic preferences.36 ° Consequently,
wholesale export of U.S. antitrust law, preferences, and enforcement
polices to China may not lead to an optimal outcome. Any country
should tailor regulations to its own preferences in order to achieve
desired economic success. The resulting AML will most likely differ
from current U.S. style antitrust laws. Indeed, the Current Draft
resembles EU antitrust laws and enforcement. If the current language is
officially enacted, it may pose significant challenges to U.S. businesses

354. Indeed, when China first announced consideration of the AML, foreign investors
were concerned that they would be targeted. See Joint Comments, supra note 154.
355. See Wehrfritz, supra note 27.
356. Through Foreign Direct Investment, investors receive ownership and control in
exchange for capital. See YASHENG HUANG, SELLING CHINA 15 (2003). Foreign
investors seek to maximize return on investment and seek markets free of government
regulation such as investment and ownership caps. Id. at 46-47.
357. China values non-profit goals such as full employment. See HAY AND MORRIS,
supra note 74. In comparison, United States businesses operate in a capitalist society.
See supra text accompanying note 31. In a capitalist society, firms seek to maximize
profits. See COOTER AND ULEN, supra note 42, at 30. In the United States, it appears that
externalities such as fair trade, anti-sweat shops, and condemning child labor are ancillary
concerns to portfolio growth and increased return on investments.
358. See CHARON, supra note 242, at 12-13; see also supra text accompanying note
285.
359. LUNCEFORD, supra note *
360. See CH-ARON, supra note 242, at 12-16.
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that are accustom to interacting under U.S. guidelines. 361
Such an outcome would not be detrimental to the world economy.
Precedent established by other economic actors, notably the EU,
establishes that different goals, definitions, and enforcement do not
significantly hinder economic interactions. However, such differences
require global antitrust collaboration. 362 Current indications suggest that
China will pass the AML and further their integration with the global
economy. 363 The world waits to see what China will do, and, more
importantly, how they do it.

361. The AML proposes anti-monopoly enforcement at fifty percent market share
compared to the higher U.S. market share requirement. See supra text accompanying
note 49; see also Current Draft, art. 15, at § 1.
362. Jurisdictional elements will be needed to prevent another GE-Honeywell fiasco,
where the United States "blessed" the merger only to have the EC condemn it, resulting
in the collapse of the merger. See Case COMP/M.220 July 3, 2001.
363. At time of publication, China introduced a new Anti-Monopoly Law. The 2007
version is currently under consideration by the State Council. The 2007 version closely
follows the 2006 version and continues to adopt a EU approach. However, there are
notable differences including the reduction in amount of fines, removal of criminal
liability and restatement of socialist market economy goals. More importantly, the 2007
version exempts SOEs from AML regulation. See 2007 Draft AML, art. vii ("Industries
controlled by the State-owned economy.., shall be protected by the State to conduct
lawful operation by the undertakings.").

